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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF GEORGE K. LEWIS, Deceased. 
- RHODA LEE LEWIS, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 19316 
v. 
BEN E. LEWIS, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of George K. Lewis, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the intention of George K. 
Lewis in writing his will and to determine the proper method 
of distribution of his estate. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
After ruling that the decedent's will is ambiguous, R. 
149 H 3, the district court took evidence of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. R. 
476. Following consideration of that evidence, and presenta-
tion by appellant of several alternative constructions of the 
will, the court ruled that both the language of the will and 
the extrinsic evidence indicated that decedent intended 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellant to receive less than the entire estate, R. 408 II 2, 
but that the precise size of her intended share was impos-
sible to determine. R. 408 IT 3. Thus, the court ordered 
distribution under the applicable succession statute. R. 408 
U 5. That distribution was to be accomplished by valuing the 
"net estate" as of the date of death, determining the per-
centage shares of the heirs based on that value, and then 
satisfying those shares using date of distribution values. 
R. 408 If 1, 409-10 1T1T 1-2. The court designated those 
portions of its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 411. The lower court's order 
is attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Respondent seeks to uphold the decision of the 
lower court that the decedent's will is inherently ambiguous 
and fails to provide for the specific distribution of his 
property. In addition, Respondent seeks an interpretation of 
the applicable succession statute that would require distri-
bution of the estate based solely on the value of the net 
estate as of the date of distribution. 
FACTS 
Respondent disputes appellant's Statement of Facts to the 
extent it implies that, at the time the 1971 will was 
-2-
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written, the relationship between George and Khoda Lewis was 
closer than the record indicates. In addition, the statement 
of facts reaches legal conclusions concerning Mrs. Lewis' 
rights under the will, omits part of the decedent's estate 
plan and fails to recognize that the decedent's collateral 
heirs were also the natural objects of his bounty. There-
fore, Respondent presents the following as its statement of 
facts in this matter. 
George Lewis was the oldest of seven brothers and 
sisters. His father died at an early age, and George assumed 
the father role in the family. R. 476 p. 3. The experience 
had two lasting impacts on decedent: it instilled in him a 
great respect for his mother, R. 180 ex. 1, 476 p. 22, and it 
caused him to watch out for his brothers and sisters through-
out his life, keeping informed of their well being and often 
loaning them money. R. 476 pp. 9, 33. 
Decedent married Rhoda Lee Lewis on May 23, 1942. R. 476 
p. 29. George and Rhoda never had any children, R. 476 p. 
29, although at the time of the marriage, Rhoda had children 
from a previous marriage. R. 476 p. 34. Decedent developed 
a good relationship with those children, although he never 
adopted them. R. 476 p. 41. The marriage was a normal 
marriage, with no serious discord developing until 1969. R. 
476 pp. 29-33. Up until 1969, the couple lived and worked 
-3-
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together on their ranch in Springdale, Utah. See R. 476 pp. 
30, 34, 35-36, 44-45. 
By 1969, some serious marital problems had developed. 
One manifestation of those problems was an alleged incident 
of physical abuse of appellant by decedent. R. 476 p. 35. 
After that alleged incident, appellant left Springdale for 
Salt Lake City, R. 476 pp. 35-36, and apparently never 
returned to live on the ranch. R. 476 p. 38. The couple was 
separated for some time, and considered divorce, but even-
tually resolved to try to reconcile the marriage. R. 476 pp. 
36-37. The district court found that they had "apparently 
completely reconciled" by 1971, R. 193, and the record indi-
cates that, although there was a complete reconciliation in 
that they had resolved to continue the marriage, they had not 
returned to a close relationship. R. 476 p. 40. George and 
i 
Rhoda bought a home in Salt Lake, but George still kept his 
bank accounts and financial records in Springdale, spent much 
of his time there without Rhoda, and apparently considered 
the ranch, rather than the house in Salt Lake, to be his 
home. R. 8, 476 pp. 9, 26. He visited Salt Lake frequently, 
but often stayed alone in a hotel rather than at the house 
i 
with his wife. R. 476 p. 15. 
The record demonstrates that decedent's brothers and 
sisters as well as his wife were the natural objects of his 
-4-
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bounty, and the district court so found, R. 194. The estate 
plan decedent had in place when he died, consisting of three 
documents, generally reflected that relationship. The first 
document is a holographic will executed in 1969 (Appendix 
"C"). R. 180 ex. 1. In it, decedent appointed an executor 
and asked that sufficient funds be set aside for the comfort 
and security of his wife, with the residue to be divided 
among his brothers and sisters. The 1969 will, although 
unrevoked, was not admitted to probate because it was dis-
covered more than three years after decedent's death. R. 
187, 471-72. Instead, it was admitted as evidence of the 
testator's intent. R. 187. 
The second document, the decedent's holographic will 
executed in 1971 (Appendix "B"), R. 474, was admitted to 
probate. R. 10. The will directs the reader to " [i]nsure 
for [Rhoda's] comfort, security and her fair portion," and 
goes on to appoint an executor and an attorney and to ask 
Rhoda to work harmoniously with them. It is the construction 
of the 1971 will that is before this court. 
The third document is a trust agreement executed in 1975, 
just 39 days before decedent's death, between decedent as 
trustor and Zions First National Bank as trustee (Appendix 
"D"). R. 180 ex. 2. Although the trust document stated that 
it was intended to comprise the entire estate plan of 
-5-
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decedent, ijd. p. 1, decedent died before completing transfer 
of all his property into the trust. The trust provides for 
division of the trust property upon decedent's death into two 
parts. The "marital trust" is to contain a value equal to 
the maximum marital deduction allowed under federal tax law, 
but is to be reduced dollar-for-dollar by any property quali-
fying for the deduction which Mrs. Lewis may receive outside 
the trust. Id. 1F 6A. The remainder of the funds after 
payment of all taxes and costs of administration is to be 
placed in a "charitable trust" in the name of decedent's 
mother, to be managed as a scholarship fund for the art 
department at Brigham Young University. Ij3. 1T1T 6B, 8. The 
lower court ruled that, because the trust document was exe-
cuted later than the will, it could not be used in construing 
the will. R. 194. Nevertheless, it ruled that the trust 
document indicated an attempt by decedent to carry out the 
express intention of his will: to provide for his wife's 
comfort, security and fair portion without giving her the 
entire estate. R. 194. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED DIS-
TRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE UNDER THE SUCCES-
SION STATUTE IN EFFECT AT DECEDENT'S DEATH. 
The entire dispositive provision of George Lewis' will 
reads as follows: 
The first request in this last will and testament is 
in behalf of my wife Rhoda. Insure for her comfort, 
security and her fair portion. There are more than 
ample funds, chattels and tangibles to provide this. 
R. 474. The district court ruled that the dispositive provi-
sion of the will was ambiguous. R. 149 IF 3. After hearing 
evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding its exe-
cution, the court held that, while the decedent intended that 
his wife receive less than the entire estate, R. 408 U 2, the 
precise size of the share he intended her to receive was 
impossible to determine. R. 408 H 3. The court therefore 
ordered distribution of the estate under the succession 
statute in effect at decedent's death. R. 408 11 5. 
^Because appellant is the only person named in the will 
as a recipient of property, she characterizes herself as 
decedent's "sole devisee" or "sole heir," and argues that the 
district court's statement that distribution was to be made 
"under the will," R. 409 U 1, is inconsistent with allowing 
anyone other than herself to receive estate property. The 
court, however, found only the dispositive provision of the 
will to have failed, and ordered distribution "under the 
will" because the will remained valid insofar as it appointed 
a personal representative and an attorney for the estate. R. 
408 II 1, 409 fl 1. See 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 31 (1975). 
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A. 
The Most Reasonable Interpretation of Decedent's 
Choice of Words is as an Acknowledgment of His 
Intention that His Property Pass Under the 
Succession Statute in Effect at His Death, 
Careful examination of the language of decedent's will 
indicates that he did not intend that the will operate as an 
instrument to effectuate a transfer of property. Even if the 
phrase "fair portion" is interpreted as a layman's reference 
to the intestate share, see 4 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on 
Wills § 36.2 at 550 (3d ed. 1960) (hereinafter Page on 
Wills), the remaining language appears intended only as a 
request that his wife's legal interest in the estate be 
protected, and is insufficient to constitute a specific or 
general bequest. 
In interpreting wills, words are to be given their usual 
and customary meanings unless a contrary meaning was clearly 
intended. Larsen v. Paskett, 29 Utah 2d 360, 510 P.2d 520, 
522 (1973). Decedent was a layman, and had he intended to 
"give" property to his wife, he would have said so. Decedent 
did not direct the reader of his will to "give" his wife her 
fair portion, but rather to "insure for" her fair portion. 
Those words indicate an intention to place the reader under 
some duty to see that decedent's wife is not taken advantage 
of, a conclusion that is even more compelling when the par-
allel construction of the entire sentence is considered. In 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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requesting the executor to "insure for her comfort, security 
and her fair portion," decedent surely did not intend to 
bequest comfort or security to his wife; rather, he merely 
intended to express his desire that her comfort and security 
be safeguarded. When applied to the "fair portion" language, 
the meaning of "insure for" does not change: it still must 
mean "safeguard". To treat the language as a bequest would 
be to assign an unnatural meaning to a term the testator used 
in an ordinary sense. 
Instead, the language is most properly treated as mani-
festing an unwillingness on decedent's part to make decisions 
concerning the specific devolution of his property upon his 
death. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of 
the decedent and make those decisions for him, because to do 
so would be to rewrite his will. In re Beal's Estate, 117 
Utah 197, 214 P.2d 525, 527 (1950). In order to avoid such a 
result, the court would have to be able to assign a specific, 
quantitative value to the phrase "fair portion." The 
district court, as will be discussed below, was simply unable 
to do so. Thus, the language of the will is most reasonably 
interpreted as a mere acknowledgement that the law of succes-
sion will provide a fair share of the estate to decedent's 
widow. See In re Klewer's Estate, 124 Cal. App. 2d 219, 268 
P.2d 544, 546 (1954). 
-9-
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B. 
The District Court was Correct in Ruling that the 
Size of the Portion the Decedent Intended to 
Describe with the Phrase "Fair Portion" Could Not be 
Determined Without Resort to Speculation or 
Conjecture. 
The district court repeatedly found decedent's general 
intent to be that his wife receive less than his entire 
estate: Mrs. Lewis was to receive a "fair portion" of the 
estate, and the estate contained "more than ample funds, 
chattels and tangibles to provide this." R. 194, 287-88, 
i 
408. The plain meaning of the word "portion" makes that 
general intent clear. The court further ruled that the 
language decedent chose to describe the size of that intended 
i 
share introduced into the will a patent ambiguity of a type 
and level that is impossible to resolve. That decision was 
correct and in conformance with the applicable law. 
i 
In interpreting a decedent's will, the court must first 
look to the language of the will itself. In re Beal's 
Estate, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 525, 527 (1950). 
( 
The intention of testator to make a testamentary 
disposition of his property, or to appoint an execu-
tor or a testamentary guardian, must be expressed in 
such terms that the court can determine his intention 
or wish without resort to conjecture. Both the thing 
given and the person to whom it is given must, in ( 
testamentary dispositions of property, be set forth 
with such certainty that the court can give effect to 
such gift when the estate is to be distributed. 
i 
-10-
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1 Page on Wills § 5.11 at 187-88. In the case at bar, the 
decedent described his wife's intended share as a "fair 
portion." The word "portion" is not necessarily ambiguous, 
because the term itself is capable of definition. It is not, 
however, capable of application in a will unless the will 
provides some separate standard specifically describing the 
intended size of the portion. In his will, decedent provided 
the word "fair" as that external standard. The word "fair" 
is also capable of definition, but that definition is inher-
ently subjective and thus fails to provide the court with the 
necessary specific standard. Thus, examination of the face 
of the will fails to reveal the specific intent of the 
decedent concerning distribution of his estate. 
Where examination of the face of the will leaves the 
court unable to determine the specific intent of the dece-
dent, the search for his intent is carried beyond the will to 
the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution. In re 
Beal's Estate, 214 P.2d at 527. Resort to such extrinsic 
evidence usually occurs where the words of the will are 
capable of supporting more than one of a limited number of 
outcomes: for example, a gift of "my home in Salt Lake City" 
when the testator owns two such homes. 4 Page on Wills 
§ 32.4. The ambiguity in this case is different. The sub-
jective nature of the word "fair" permits definition along an 
-11-
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infinite spectrum of amounts depending on the disposition of 
the defining party. Even more objective external standards 
of fairness, if there are such, allow great latitude for the 
- exercise of discretion. Absent written declarations outside 
the will, the only extrinsic evidence that could reveal the 
meaning the testator attached to the term would be his oral 
declarations. Such evidence, however, is inadmissible to 
explain an ambiguity in a will. In re Sargavak's Estate, 41 
Cal. 2d 314, 259 P.2d 897, 899 (1953); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 74-2-2 (repealed 1977). In any event, the record reveals 
no such declarations. R. 476. 
The extrinsic evidence in this case shows that, at the 
time the will was written, decedent and his wife were experi-
encing marital difficulties, although they had resolved to 
reconcile the marriage. R. 475 pp. 36-37, 40. They were 
apparently living apart. R. 476 pp. 15, 21. Decedent exe-
cuted a prior will in which he demonstrated an intent that 
his wife receive less than the entire estate. R. 180 ex. 1. 
Finally, just prior to his death, decedent attempted to carry 
out the expressed intention of his will by executing a trust 
document giving his wife a "portion" equal to the maximum 
federal estate tax marital deduction. R. 180 ex. 2 H 6A. 
This evidence supports the court's finding that the decedent 
intended to use the word "portion" in its customary sense, as 
-12-
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less than the whole. The intended size of the portion, how-
ever, remains a mystery. By failing to designate the size of 
the portion in objective terms, the decedent created a patent 
ambiguity that is incapable of resolution without resort to 
speculation or conjecture. 4 Page on Wills § 5.12 at 192. 
Thus, that provision of the will must fail and the estate 
must be distributed under the applicable succession statute. 
Estate of Manatakis v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 
412, 303 P.2d 701, 702 (1956). 
POINT II 
THE THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION ADVANCED BY 
APPELLANT ESSENTIALLY REQUIRE THE COURT TO 
REWRITE DECEDENT'S WILL. 
Appellant has advanced several interpretations of the 
will under which she would receive George Lewis' entire 
estate. All of appellant's interpretations, however, ignore 
the natural interpretation of the decedent's language dis-
cussed above and the impossibility of attaching a specific 
objective meaning to the phrase "fair portion." Instead, 
those interpretations rely on selective extension of rules of 
construction to reach results that require tortured legal 
interpretation of the language of the will. 
The rule of construction that the intent of the 
testator must be carried out does not authorize 
courts to make a new will to conform to what they 
think the testator intended, but the intent of the 
-13-
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testator must be ascertained from the will as it 
stands. Nor does the rule that testacy rather than 
intestacy is preferred relieve courts from the obli-
gation to construe the language of the will accord-
ing to the legal effect of the words used. 
In re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 525, 527 (1950) 
(citations omitted). 
The decedent made clear, and the district court found, 
that appellant should receive only a "portion" of the estate, 
yet appellant contorts the plain meaning of that language in 
order to defeat that intention. In so doing, she places 
rules of construction ahead of the fundamental rule of law 
favoring the testator's intent. In addition, she ignores the 
weakness of the word "insure" as a basis for a specific 
bequest of property. Finally, she ignores the inherent 
ambiguity of the phrase "fair portion"; her attempt to impose 
numerous meanings upon the phrase, each of which she contends 
i 
is an equally "reasonable" interpretation of the will, demon-
strates for the court the weakness of her contention that the 
phrase is capable of definition. Each of appellant's argu-
i 
ments will be briefly discussed below. 
A. 
Appellant Should Not Receive the Entire Estate Based | 
on Her Theory that the Will Creates an Imperative 
Power of Appointment. 
Appellant's major theory of recovery is that the dece-
dent's will creates an imperative power of appointment or < 
-14-
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power in trust. Based on the alleged creation of that power, 
appellant argues that either respondent must appoint the 
entire estate to her or, in the alternative, that his alleged 
delay in exercising the power until after the effective date 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code caused its intestate succes-
sion provision, under which she would receive the entire 
estate, to apply. As will be shown below, the will is insuf-
ficient to support appellant's contention that such a power 
was created, and even if it were sufficient, the result would 
remain unchanged because respondent's actions can be inter-
preted as a permissible exercise of the discretion the power 
would give him. 
1# The will cannot be interpreted as creating an 
imperative power of appointment. 
Appellant's argument that the will creates an imperative 
power of appointment suffers from several weaknesses. First, 
the language of the will is insufficient to create a power of 
appointment. Powers of appointment are not freely implied, 
and the donor of the alleged power must intend to create a 
power. 72 C.J.S. Powers, Section 10 (1951). In addition, to 
create a power, the donor must specify a donee and the prop-
erty over which the power is to be exercised. Id. 
Decedent's will fails all these tests. The words "insure 
for" in the will, even when considered in light of the 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
surrounding facts and circumstances, are insufficient to 
support the requisite intention to create a power, and are 
more reasonably interpreted as merely precatory directions to 
those involved in administration of the estate. See 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 25 comment b (1959). 
Furthermore, the will names the alleged donee of the power, 
Ben Lewis, only as executor of the decedent, and thus fails 
to establish the essential link between the alleged donative 
words and the alleged donee. 
More fundamentally, however, appellant's argument leaps 
to the conclusion that Ben Lewis must appoint the entire 
estate to her, without adequately considering the premises 
upon which that conclusion is based. A power of appointment 
is a vehicle under which the donor of the power places dis-
cretion in a carefully chosen donee to decide how his prop-
erty should be distributed. That discretion is considered so 
personal to the donee that courts generally refuse to direct 
donees of any power, including an imperative power, to exer-
cise the power in a particular way. Restatement of Property 
§ 320 at 1830 (1940). The alleged power in this case does 
not compel the respondent to appoint anything to appellant; 
i 
rather, it gives him two levels of discretion: to decide 
what constitutes a "fair portion" of the estate, and to 
determine how best to "insure for" that portion. 
-16-
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Ben Lewis' decision to appoint nothing to appellant 
results in appellant receiving both a statutory "fair 
portion" under the succession law and a share of the estate 
under the trust created by decedent prior to his death equal 
to the maximum marital deduction allowed under Federal tax 
law. Respondent's decision can thus be interpreted as a 
proper exercise of his discretion to "insure" that appellant 
receive a "fair portion" of her deceased husband's property. 
Indeed, an order directing Ben Lewis to appoint additional 
property to appellant would be tantamount to a judicial over-
ride of both the legislature's determination of the widow's 
fair portion under the succession statute and of the dece-
dent's determination of a fair portion under the terms of the 
trust. 
The language of the will specifically limits the property 
subject to the alleged power to a "fair portion" of the 
estate. The very inability of the District Court to define 
the size of that portion when considering the validity of the 
language as a bequest precludes the contention that it can be 
defined in the power of appointment context, yet, if the 
court orders Ben Lewis to appoint a "fair portion" to appel-
lant, it would necessarily have to assume responsibility for 
deciding whether a "fair portion" has been appointed, and 
thus what portion of the estate constitutes a "fair 
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portion". The conclusion is inescapable: The property over 
which the power is to be exercised is not adequately defined, 
and in any event does not include the entire estate. See 72 
C.J.S. Powers § 10 (1951). 
Appellant cites In Re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 
P.2d 781 (1952) as authority for the proposition that dece-
dent created an imperative power in the case at bar. The 
operative language of the will in Rowlandf s was as follows: 
All things not mentioned in my Will I leave it 
up to Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Cuthbert, Sr., to distribute 
to any of my close friends. Please give generously 
to Maria Discombe who has been a faithful maid. 
241 P.2d at 783. The Cuthberts appointed all of the property 
to themselves. IQ. The court ruled that the language of the 
will created an imperative power of appointment, and ordered 
the Cuthberts to "give generously" to Maria Discombe. 1x3. at 
785. The case is distinguishable from the case at bar in 
several respects. First, in Rowland's, the decedent gave a 
clear direction to give property to the maid, whereas George 
Lewis' direction was only to "insure for her . . . fair 
portion". 
In addition, the decedent in Rowland's made clear her 
intention that the Cuthberts were to have a power of appoint-
ment, whereas George Lewis failed to even specifically desig-
nate the donee of the alleged power. In Rowland's, if the 
-18-
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Cuthberts had not been ordered to appoint the property to the 
maid, the maid would have received nothing, a result directly 
in conflict with the decedent's express intent, and the prop-
erty would have escheated to the state. Id. at 783. In this 
case, Mrs. Lewis has already received a substantial share of 
her husband's property through the trust, and will receive 
even more as her intestate share of his estate. 
Finally, the court in Rowland's sidestepped the obvious 
difficulty of defining the word "generously" by stating that 
the issue was not before the court. 1^ 3. at 785. The case is 
not controlling, and while it reached an equitable result in 
a difficult case, it did so based on a novel and not widely 
applicable theory which should be confined to the facts of 
the case. This court should not find that George Lewis 
intended to create an imperative power of appointment. 
2. Even if an imperative power of appointment is found, 
the intestate succession provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code are inapplicable to this case. 
In apparent recognition of the problems of definition and 
enforcement this court would face in ordering the donee of 
her alleged power of appointment to exercise his discretion 
in any particular way, appellant argues that, by delaying 
until 1982 his decision not to exercise the alleged impera-
tive power of appointment, the personal representative post-
poned the vesting of assets past the effective date of the 
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Utah Uniform Probate Code and thus caused the intestate suc-
cession provisions of that Code to become applicable. Under 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, the surviving spouse is not 
required to share estate assets with the deceased spouse's 
collateral relatives. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102 (a) (1978). 
While appellant presents this argument as an apparent alter-
native to her argument that Ben Lewis must appoint the entire 
estate to herf it contradicts her position that an imperative 
power was created. An imperative power is similar to a 
trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 27 comment b 
(1959). By definition, it requires the donee to appoint the 
property, and it creates an immediate property right in the 
beneficiary. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Powers Section 4 (1959). Thus, 
rights under an imperative power, like the rights of the 
beneficiary of a trust, vest immediately, with only the need 
for court intervention left in doubt. See 1 L. Simes & A. 
Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 442 (1956). 
The fundamental rule is that distribution of the estate 
is to be determined under the law effective at the decedent's 
death. In Re Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 
1980). From the premise that the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
protects accrued rights, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101(d) 
(1978), appellant reasons that the vesting of rights is the 
key to determining which law to apply. The accrued rights 
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provision of the new Code, however, appears in the context of 
rights accrued or barred by the passage of time. A rule that 
vesting of rights determines which law governs is impossible 
to apply: vesting of rights cannot be determined without 
reference to the person in whom the rights vest, which in 
turn cannot be determined without reference to which law is 
to be applied. The mere fact that final disposition of the 
estate could not be determined until 1982 should in no way 
affect the fundamental rule adopting the law in effect on the 
decedent's date of death. 
B. 
The Will Should Not be Construed as a Bequest of the 
Entire Estate to Appellant. 
Appellant contends that the will should be interpreted, 
based on the rule of construction favoring testacy over 
intestacy, as a bequest of the entire estate to her. That 
rule of construction, however, is overridden by two paramount 
rules of law: the intention of the testator is controlling, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-603 (1978), 74-2-1 (repealed 1977), 
and where that intention cannot be determined from the face 
of the will or from the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
the court will not speculate as to the intention and rewrite 
the will. In Re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 525, 
527 (Utah 1950) . 
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The will states in unambiguous terms that appellant is to 
receive only a "portion" of the estate. It is the size of 
that portion that is defined ambiguously. The trial court 
found that the decedent intended the word "portion" in its 
usual and customary sense, as a part of the whole. R. 408. 
Appellant directs attention to extrinsic evidence of the 
couple's reconciliation, to the testator's failure to name 
others in his will, and to the decedent's concerns over the 
"complications of probate." In so doing, appellant seeks 
impermissibly to contradict the plain meaning of the word 
"portion" and to create an ambiguity that is simply not 
there. In re Barnes' Estate, 4 Utah 2d 375, 294 P.2d 711, 
712 (1956); 4 Page on Wills § 32.1 at 230-32. Had decedent ' 
intended to bequest his entire estate to his wife, he would 
have said so. Appellant's argument that the will leaves the 
entire estate to her directly contradicts the words of the 
will, and adoption of that construction would be tantamount 
to rewriting the decedent's will. 
; ., :..' C . • 
The Will Should Not be Construed as a Bequest of the 
Intestate Share to Appellant. 
Appellant argues that the language of the will amounts to 
a bequest of the intestate share to her, with a second 
intestate share to be given her as an heir. That argument, 
-22-
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however, finds no support in either the law or the facts. 
Although the weight of authority is to the contrary, a dece-
dent could arguably intend to devise to his spouse an amount 
equal to her intestate share, with the balance going to her 
as an heir. See 4 Page on Wills §§ 36.2, 36.21. That 
result, however, does not follow in the usual case, when the 
words of the testator merely manifest an intention to leave 
her to her intestate share. Ij3. In the case at bar, the 
decedent clearly intended his wife to receive only a portion 
of the estate. Where two constructions are plausible, the 
construction upholding the decedent's intention must be 
chosen. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1978), § 74-2-1 (repealed 
1977). The decedent's language here is most reasonably 
interpreted as leaving his wife to her intestate share, with 
precatory language directing those involved to insure that 
she get it, rather than as a specific bequest of that share. 
D. 
The Will Should Not be Construed as a Bequest of the 
"Bulk" of the Estate to Appellant. 
Appellant argues that the language of the will should be 
interpreted as a devise of the "bulk of" the estate to her, 
with the balance of the estate going to her under the succes-
sion statute* She bases that argument on the lower courtfs 
finding that the decedent intended his widow to receive the 
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"bulk of" the estate. Her extension of that ruling, however, 
finds no support in the record and does not support her con-
clusion. The district court found that the decedent intended 
-his wife to get the "bulk of" the estate, but also found that 
she should not receive the entire estate and that the dece-
dent's brothers and sisters were also the natural objects of 
his bounty. R. 403. The court did not find the will to make 
a gift of the bulk of the estate to her; rather, it found 
that application of the succesion statute would result in her 
receiving the bulk of the estate, a result it found to be in 
line with the testator's general intent. R. 403 11 3. 
Under the applicable succession statute, the surviving 
spouse receives the first $100,000 of the deceased spouse's 
estate, and shares the balance with the deceased spouse's 
collateral relatives. Appellant argues that, based on the 
size of the estate and the interaction of the alleged bequest 
with the surviving spouse's share under the succession 
statute, she will receive the entire estate if she is given 
at least 42.6% in value under the will. That result occurs 
because the value of the remaining intestate portion of the 
estate would then be less than $100,000. Appellant defines 
"fair portion" as the "bulk of" the estate, and defines 
"bulk" as at least 51%. She concludes that a more accurate 
definition of "fair portion" or "bulk" is rendered 
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unnecessary because she would in any event receive more than 
42.6% of the estate under the will and the balance under the 
succession statute. 
Appellant's result-oriented approach may offer an easy 
way out, but it is not the law. The mere fact that the court 
might place the gift within a broad range which, under these 
facts, would give appellant the entire estate neither changes 
the legal effect of the words used nor relieves the court of 
its obligation to construe those words according to that 
legal effect. In re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 
525, 527 (1950). Either the gift is specific enough that the 
court can determine its size without resort to speculation or 
conjecture, or it is not. Appellant asks the court not to 
bother with so specifically defining "fair portion," but in 
so doing tacitly admits that even she cannot extract the 
requisite specific meaning from the phrase. Her argument 
that the will makes a gift of the "bulk of" the estate to 
her, like the rest of the interpretations espoused in her 
brief, ignores the unresolved ambiguity of the will and 
relies instead upon tortured legal construction of terms the 
decedent used in an ordinary sense. 
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POINT III 
THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE SUCCESSION 
STATUTE IS THAT THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IS 
ENTITLED TO THE FIRST $100,000 PLUS HALF 
THE BALANCE OF THE NET PROBATE ESTATE 
VALUED AS OF THE DATE OF DISTRIBUTION. 
Proper application of the succession statute in effect at 
decedent's death, Utah Code Ann. § 74-4-5(3), 1971 Laws of 
Utah ch. 189 § 13 (repealed 1977) , requires a single valua-
tion, as of the date of distribution, with the surviving 
spouse receiving the first $100,000 in value and sharing the 
remainder with the decedent's collateral relatives. See In 
Re Estate of Dixon, 73 Wyo. 236, 278 P.2d 258, 265-67 (1954); 
Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4th 989, 999 (1981). The district court 
interpreted that statute to require the personal representa- < 
tive to determine the value of the net estate as of the date 
of death and date of distribution, and to distribute the net 
distributable estate at current value pursuant to percentage .< 
shares derived from the date of death valuation. R. 409-10. 
Appellant seeks to preclude redetermination of the value of 
the net estate as of the date of death. ( 
A . „ ' ' • 
Review of the District Courtfs Scheme of Statutory 
Interpretation Should Not be Limited to the Issue of i 
Redetermination of Date of Death Values. 
While appellant seeks to preclude redetermination of date 
of death values, she seeks to otherwise preserve the district 
-26-
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court1 s scheme of interpretation on the basis that respondent 
did not cross-appeal the remaining portions of that order. 
By questioning a part of the lower court's interpretation, 
however, appellant has brought into issue the entire inter-
pretation of the statute: interpretation of part of the 
statute necessarily affects interpretation of the remainder 
of the statute* See American Enterprise v. Van Winkle, 39 
Cal. 2d 210, 246 P.2d 935, 937-38 (1952). Cf. Attorney 
General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (1937). 
If this court determines that distribution should be based 
solely on date of distribution valuations, then date of death 
values become irrelevant and decision on appellant's conten-
tion that date of death values cannot be redetermined becomes 
unnecessary. If, however, the court approaches the problem 
from appellant's limited scope, it will create a precedent 
indirectly approving the use of date of death values in 
distribution of estates. Under the succession statute, as 
will be seen below, the various steps in distribution of the 
estate are so interrelated that, in order to preserve the 
legislative intention regarding distributions, the issues 
raised by the court's interpretation of the statute must be 
resolved considering the statute as a whole. 
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B. 
The Estate Should be Distributed Based Solely on 
Date of Distribution Valuation* 
The applicable section of the succession statute provides 
as follows: 
If the decedent leaves no issue, all of the 
estate, real and personal, of which the decedent 
died seized or possessed, of not over $100,000 in 
value exclusive of debts and expenses, goes to the 
surviving husband or wife; and if over that value, 
$100,000 in value thereof goes to the surviving 
husband or wife, and the excess goes 1/2 to the 
surviving husband or wife and the other 1/2 to the 
decedent's father and mother, in equal shares, and 
if either is dead, the whole of said half goes to 
the other; if there is no father or mother, then 1/2 
of such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers 
and sisters of the decedent, and to children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by 
right of representation; if the decedent leaves no 
issue or husband or wife, the estate must go to his 
father and mother in equal shares and if either is 
dead then to the other. 
1971 Laws of Utah at 592. The language of the statute itself 
supports respondent's position that distribution should be 
based solely on the value of the net estate on the date of 
distribution, and that the legislature did not intend to 
create a fractional share system of distribution. The 
statute provided that the surviving spouse should get "all of 
the estate . . . of not over $100,000 in value exclusive of 
debts and expenses . . . ." 1971 Laws of Utah at 592 
(emphasis added). The expenses of the estate are primarily 
the costs associated with probate and administration, and 
-28-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cannot finally be determined until administration of the 
estate is complete. By directing that the calculation be 
made excluding debts and expenses, the legislature demon-
strated an intention that the distribution be based on the 
net estate at the date of distributionf because debts and 
expenses cannot be finally determined until that time. 
Indeedf the Utah Uniform Probate Code, which the legisla-
tive enacted effective in 1977, is consistent with that 
interpretation: 
Any homestead or family allowance or devise 
payable in money may be satisfied by value in kind 
provided: 
. . . 
(ii) The property distributed in kind is 
valued at fair market value as of the date of 
distribution . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-906(b) (1978). Although the section is 
not specifically directed at intestate succession it never-
theless deals with the same issue: how is a share payable in 
a specified sum of money to be satisfied? The legislature 
chose to satisfy that share based solely on date of distribu-
tion valuation. In so doing, it placed on language similar 
to the old succession statute a reasonable interpretation 
that avoids the multiple valuations inherent in the 
approaches of appellant and the district court. That action 
can properly be treated as a clarification of a principle 
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implicit in the old codef and thus should be weighed in the 
interpretations of the prior code section. See Okland 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 
(Utah 1974) . 
The district court's interpretation is one step removed 
from that approach, in that it bases the rights of the heirs 
on the value of the net distributable estate at the date of 
death rather than the date of distribution. Under the 
district court's interpretation of the statute, revaluation 
is required because the net estate was unknown prior to 
administration. The language of the statute is contrary to 
such an interpretation. In addition, such a revaluation 
unnecessarily burdens the heirs with the expense of an addi-
tional appraisal of the estate. Had the legislature intended 
such a complex scheme of distribution, surely it would have 
provided more explanation to an executor trying to arrive at 
a proper distribution of the estate. 
Appellant's position is farther afield. Appellant argues 
i 
that the valuation for tax purposes is final, and that errors 
discovered later cannot be corrected. To require the respec-
tive shares of the heirs to be determined based on valuations 
i 
made for tax purposes prior to estate administration, as 
appellant argues should be done, is to ignore both the need 
for administration of the estate and the valuation elections 
-30-
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available under the tax law. During administration, addi-
tional assets may be discovered, and encumbrances on other 
assets may become apparent. In addition, the act of adminis-
tration itself creates expenses which affect the value of the 
net estate. No adequate determination of the value of the 
net estate for distribution purposes can be made at the date 
of death. 
Theoretically, appellant's approach could lead to either 
benefit or detriment to an individual heir, depending on 
whether the estate appreciates or depreciates in value during 
the period of administration. Distributing the estate based 
on the tentative values assigned for tax purposes at the 
beginning of administration disproportionately assigns the 
risk of decreases in estate value or discovery of new debts 
to the surviving spouse and deprives the collateral heirs of 
participation in increasing values or discovery of new 
assets. Appellant is evidently asserting this position 
because this estate has appreciated. The Internal Revenue 
Code recognizes these problems and permits the executor to 
elect alternate valuation dates and requires him to file 
supplemental information if it affects the amount of tax 
due. See I.R.C. § 2032; Treas. Reg. § 20.6081-1. 
An example demonstrates the practical problems with 
appellantfs position. Suppose decedent owned an arid tract 
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of land in a remote area, and that, because of the lack of 
water, the land is included in the estate at a very low 
value. Subsequently, during administration, the personal 
- representative finds that the decedent owned several shares 
of water along with the land. The personal representative 
could conceivably have an appraiser determine the value the 
stock had as of the date of death, but appellant's position 
would preclude the court and the personal representative from 
amending the valuation placed on the land itself even though 
all the parties know the value to be erroneous. Appellant 
would bind the parties to an arbitrary figure that fails to 
reflect the relative interests of the heirs at the date of 
death. Waiting until the date of distribution, when all of 
the assets have been assembled and all the claims have been 
paid, eliminates this guesswork and uncertainty. 
C. 
Neither Respondent's "Verification" of the Values, 
His Failure to File an Inventory, Nor Appellant's 
Reliance on Initial Valuations Should Preclude 
Proper Interpretation or Application of the 
Succession Statute. 
Appellant seeks to preclude revaluation of estate assets 
on the basis of verification by the personal representative 
of the values, failure of the personal representative to file 
an inventory and appraisement, and appellant's own alleged 
-32-
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reliance. Appellant's .argument hinges on a threshold propo-
sition that the alleged conduct of the personal representa-
tive was wrongful. The correctness of that conduct, however, 
is still before the district court, and respondent denies 
having done anything wrong. Because the disputed conclusions 
upon which appellant relies are still before the district 
court, this court cannot rely upon them in resolution of the 
separate issues raised by this appeal. Nevertheless, because 
appellant has raised the issue, respondent will deal with 
appellant's argument. 
The major flaw with appellant's argument is that it 
relies on alleged conduct of the personal representative in 
administering the estate as a basis for depriving decedent's 
collateral heirs of their legal share of the estate. In 
pointing to the activities of the respondent in administering 
the estate, appellant confuses the dual nature of respon-
dent's role in this estate. Respondent is both personal 
representative of the estate and a potential heir of the 
decedent. Regardless of whether the actions of the personal 
representative in his representative capacity were justified 
or not, appellant should not be permitted to use those 
actions to reduce the shares of the heirs of the estate in 
their capacity as heirs. 
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In this appeal, respondent is named in his representative 
capacity. In that capacity, respondent owes a fiduciary duty 
to the estate and the heirs. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703 
- (1978). The proper remedy for breach of that duty is removal 
of the personal representative, ic[. § 75-3-611, or possible 
damages for any actual loss which might have resulted to the 
estate. 1x3. §§ 75-3-711f -808. Appellant is pursuing those 
remedies in the part of this action remaining in the lower 
court. R. 401, 410. Neither the other heirs of the estate 
nor respondent in his capacity as an heir should be made to 
forfeit a part of the estate to which they would otherwise be 
entitled based solely on the personal representative's 
activities. 
Respondent did not, as appellant contends, verify the 
correctness of the values in his October 20, 1982 petition; 
rather, he verified that they were the values shown on the 
tax return and, correct or not, were being used as a conve-
nient starting point for showing the changes in value since 
death. R. 39, 158. They were not intended as a basis for 
calculating the vested share of each heir. See R. 157-77. 
Indeed, the tax return values were properly calculated to 
take advantage of assumptions that would reduce the estate's 
tax liability, and were verified to be correct only to the 
best of respondent's knowledge at the time. R. 66. 
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Respondent's failure to file the inventory and appraise-
ment required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-7-1 et seq. (repealed 
1977) should not change the result. Although it also 
provided a basis for the executor's feef see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-11-25 (repealed 1977); In Re Wheelwright's Estate, 14 
Utah 2d 225, 381 P.2d 717, 718 (1963), the inventory and 
appraisement system was primarily just a method of charging 
the executor with responsibility for the assets in his 
control: 
Every executor and administrator is chargeable in 
his account with the whole of the estate of the 
decedent which may come into his possession at the 
value of the appraisement contained in the inventory 
• • • • 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-11-20 (repealed 1977). See also 33 
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators, §§ 129, 135 (1942). 
Indeed, for that reason, the appraised value was the value of 
the estate when received by the executor, and not when the 
decedent died. L3. § 135. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1 
(repealed 1977). The inventory and appraisal requirements 
were not intended to provide a basis for distribution of the 
estate. 
Finally, appellant's reliance on her own interpretation 
of the succession statute and of the binding effect of the 
tax valuation should not prevent the court from ordering a 
proper interpretation of the statute. In any event, the 
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record reflects neither reliance nor any damage that might 
have resulted therefrom. Decedent's estate should be dis-
tributed based on an interpretation of the succession statute 
-requiring only a single, date of distribution valuation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings that the will is ambiguous and 
that the surrounding facts merely substantiate the plain 
meaning of the word "portion" are correct and supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. All of appellant's 
alternative interpretations of the will suffer from the same 
weakness: they selectively apply rules of construction in a 
manner that circumvents the clear intention of decedent and 
ignores the plain meaning and legal effect of the words of 
the will. The most reasonable interpretation of decedent's 
language is as an acknowledgement that his wife would receive 
a fair portion under the succession statute. George Lewis 
was not a lawyer, and his holographic will should be inter-
preted from a layman's standpoint. Had he intended his wife 
to receive the entire estate, he would merely have said so. 
Had he intended a power of appointment, he would have speci-
fied more clearly who was to exercise the power. 
Thus, the district court's decision to distribute the 
estate under the succession statute in effect at decedent's 
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death was correct. In order to avoid undue expense and dis-
proportionate allocation of risk among the heirs, the shares 
of the heirs should be determined using the value of the 
estate assets on the date of distribution. At the very 
leastf appellant's argument that the date of death valuations 
used for tax purposes are binding should be rejected, because 
that argument presumes that the final net estate will not 
differ from the initial gross estate and precludes the court 
and the parties from adjusting values they all know to be 
incorrect. 
The rule of construction favoring testacy over intestacy 
is intended to prevent courts from invalidating a decedent's 
will and thus defeating his intention. In the case at barf 
however, distributing the decedent's estate under the succes-
sion statute is the best method for insuring that decedent's 
intention concerning the disposition of his property is 
carried out. 
DATED this 5rK day of December, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
TffiJL 
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GEORGE N. LARSEN 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 511 
Salt Lake'City, Utah 84111 
eohcme tSOl) 322-1068 —^'-~ 
f-v.- . -r .- ' - ' -tt- ' - icJ*^-
\ JVM 6 1983 
k - •—;:'™~. iw xs otsi ?iltn . 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
t . 
It IN'THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GEORGE K. LEWIS, 
Deceased. 
ORDER CONSTRUING DECEDENT'S 
WILL DETERMINING DISTRIBUTION 
AND PROVIDING FOR PARTIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE 
Probate No. 62138 
- --1 
On October 14, 1982, Ben E. Lev/is, Personal Represen-
ji tative of the above-referenced Estate, filed his Petition for 
jf 
jj Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution, Thereafter on 
jjNovember 8, 1982, the decedent's surviving spouse filed the 
|i 
iiPetition of Rhoda Lee Lewis Objecting to Proposed Distribution on 
» 
ithe basis that she was entitled to the decedent's entire estate 
and seeking to surcharge the Personal Representative and his 
attorneys for various alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. 
Preliminary, hearings were held before the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier on November 17, 1982, December 1/ 1982, and December 22, 
1982. Kent B. Alderman, Esq. appeared at these hearings on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I i 
I behalf of Ben E. Lewis, Personal Representative. Charles M. ! 
Bennett/ Esq. appeared on behalf of Rhoda Lee Lev/is. At the ! 
December 1# 1982 hearing/ a special evidentiary hearing was 
{^ ctieduled for "December 23/1982 for the purpose of determining j 
{testator's intent in executing his will dated November 5/ 1971. 
The December 22f 1982 hearing was for the purpose of determining 
whether or not decedent's December/ 1969 will should be admitted 
[j to - probate---as an unrevoked-prior^will^ or should be admitted as 
I evidence for the purpose of assisting the Court in determining 
jltestator's intent. On December 23/ 1982 an evidentiary hearing was 
i held before the Honorable Scott Daniels (Pursuant to a transfer 
jarranged by Judge Fishier). Kent B. Alderman/ Esq. appeared 
representing the Personal Representative, Ben E. Lewis# and 
jjCharles M. Bennett/ Esq. and H. Russell Hettinger/ Esq. appeared 
I representing Rhoda Lee Lewis. After hearing the testimony of 
|!witnesses/ receiving documentary evidence, and hearing arguments of 
(counsel/ the Court took the matter under advisement and# on 
['December 30/ 1982/ the Court entered a Memorandum Decision which j 
jheld as follows: * ' ' ; -" % ' j 
| 1. Based upon the November 5r 1971 will/ testator's 
I first concern was that his widow be adequately taken care of and 
testator stated that there were more than ample funds to provide 
for his widow. 
it • * 
1 • * i 
- 2 -
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2. Based upon the language of the will, testator 
intended that his widow should receive her fair "portion". The 
word "portion" being used in its ordinary and common sense as a j 
I f>art of the estate, not the wfrole7estate."~ ~~ " "*~'~r.• " } 
I 3. Based upon the language of the will, the testator j 
intended that his widov; was to receive the bulk of the estate, but 
he did not intend to disinherit his brothers and sisters who were 
1 - • ' - ' • , . '• ' * " ' - ' • ' • - ? " - • • '4: - • • - , " - • - - . ; . • • - • • • . ' • 
I heirs and were also objects-of his"bounty.: ; *^,r ;;-. •,_ ,, ; K 
r • -• • • - • . •• - • • • . : - . • • • • - • • - • . • • • 
j 4. Testator did not die intestate and the most logical 
{interpretation of the testatorfs November 5, 1971 will is that his 
jproperty be distributed in accordance with the intestate succession 
statutes. > • . * ;:; r • I 
5. There appears to be no reason why a partial distri-
bution of the estate should not be made at this time. j 
' I 
In January, 1983, counsel for Ben E. Lewis, Personal 
j Representative of the Estate, submitted a proposed Order under | 
iDistrict Court Rule 2.9 pursuant to the Court's Memorandum j 
] Decision. Prior to entry of the Order pursuant to the Memorandum J 
Decision, Petitioner, Rhoda Lee Lewis, filed a Petition under . j 
J 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to amend the , J. 
Memorandum Decision alleging an error of law and requesting a 
further hearing and objecting to the proposed Order. Petitioner 
j requested that the Memorandum Decision be amended to hold that 
Petitioner was the only devisee under the will. ( 
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|i On February 1, 1983, a further hearing was held before ] 
ithe Honorable Scott Daniels. Kent B. Alderman, Esq. was | 
jj present representing Ben E. Lewis, Personal Representative of the ! 
!|_Estate.. Charley Jl.; ^ e jLne.tW^q^a^^^ 
| were present representing" Pet it iohef1~^S'ter" hea'ri ng^^e^uVther^ f 
J arguments of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
On February 16, 1983, the Court entered its further Memorandum | 
Decision. Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision, the Court.found, 
jthat: '•' •'• • . , ' ,: ::;v/: ":" '• '^:^'^-..^ --^- -j 
] 1. Based upon the language of the will, the testator \ 
I i 
did not intend that his widow receive the entire estate* 
j 2. Testator used the word "portion" in its ordinary { 
I meaning; that is, a part of the whole, but not the whole amount, j 
j 3. Testator's will is effective in appointing Ben E. 
I Lewis as executor, but it fails to designate specific properties 
\ I 
land portions for disposition of the testator's property. There-
i I 
; fore, the property should be distributed according to the succes-
* j 
| sion statutes of the State of Utah in effect at the date of 
|jdecedent's death. This distribution accords with the testator's 
expressed general intent. - • j 
4. The remainder of the issues raised by Petitioner, 
Rhoda Lee Lewis, should be set on the trial calendar. In the 
[event that a trial date, cannot be obtained within a reasonably 
ij short period of time, the case can be set for special hearing j 
II before this Court with the approval of the Probate Judge. j 
I • 
i i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
! 
* i 
J 5. It appears that Rhoda Lee Lewis is entitled to a j 
i I 
jdistribution of $175,230.03 of estate assets and such a distribu-
tion can take place at this time. j 
•••'••••-• Thereafter/ on February 25; 19B3; prior to**entry of an j Order pursuant to the Court's decision, Rhoda Lee Lewis filed a 
further Petition again requesting that the Court amend its 
decision and hold that the language of the will be interpreted as 
Jjan imperative power of appointment and further seeking an Order 
idetermining when the right to estate assets vests. 
A hearing was held on this Petition of Rhoda Lee Lewis 
II 
j;on March 11, 1983. Kent B. Alderman, Esq. and Charles M. Bennett,; 
jEsq., were present and argued on behalf of their respective 
j 
jclients. At the hearing, the Court reaffirmed its prior Memoran-
jdum Decision and denied that portion of the Petition requesting 
i | that the language of the will be held to be a power of appointment,* 
i 
i 
jThe Court took under advisement the portion of the Petition 
regarding the date vesting be determined and arguments regarding 
computation of distributive shares under the succession statutes. 
On April 6, 1983, the Court entered its third Memorandum 
Decision which reaffirmed its second Memorandum Decision as to the 
proper construction and interpretation of the decedent's will. 
The Court also held as follows: 
\ 
\ . • 
i 
! 
i • A^fi 
, - e; _ 
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1. A proper distribution under the intestate succession 
statute is determined by valuing the estate at the time of death, 
calculating appropriate percentage based upon that value, and 
2. That there are still further issues to be set for 
trial which should be set at the earliest possible time* 
3. It appears, under the approach of either party, that; 
jfche r e~ is -some vminimum amount of - -the^  estate - whi c-fe : .could be ,d isrr^^q-
tributed to the Petitioner, Rhoda Lee Lev/is, immediately, and 
that amount should be distributed to her forthwith. 
On April 28, 1983, prior to the entry of an Order 
pursuant to the Court's April 6, 1983 Memorandum Decision, Ben E. 
Lewis, Personal Representative of the Estate, filed a Petition 
pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure *":"' ""' 
requesting that the Court amend its April 6, 1983 Memorandum 
Decision and alleging a manifest error of, law in the application 
of the succession statutes. 
On May 20, 1983,. a further hearing was held before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels. -Kent B. Alderman, Esq. was present 
representing Ben E. Lewis, Personal Representative of the Estate. 
Charles M. Bennett, Esq. was present representing Rhoda Lee Lewis, 
the surviving spouse. After hearing the further arguments of 
counsel as to the proper application of the succession statute, 
Ai>? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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;valuation of estate assets, and the interpretation of Georae K. j 
i " ! 
|Lewis1 will, the Court found: 
1. The proper application of the succession statute is 
tp, .determine ther jie.t.^ yialjie^ af^  es.tate "^ssats^atL-date ^ fcxleath ..._...__-• 
values, including after-discovered assets and any increase or 
decrease in inventory due to correction of appraisal values or 
increase or decrease in assets included in the probate estate, 
paying .deteirminec^AhfiL n^t, j>xohate^estate* ^ allocating -to
 rthe •_...... 
surviving spouse the first $100,000.00 in value of the net estate 
and 1/2 of the balance of such net estate over $100,000.00 in 
value, then calculate what percentage of the net probate estate 
| the surviving spouse's share represents and apply that resulting 
i percentage to the net distributable estate available for distri-
\ bution at the date of distribution, thus guaranteeing that the 
surviving spouse shall share any net gain in the value of the 
!estate either by way of income or appreciation and any net loss 
! to the estate by way of expense or depreciation of asset values. 
| 2. .That it is incumbent upon the Personal Represen-
tative to ascertain the value of the net estate at date of death 
values, including any after-discovered assets added to inventory 
or assets included in inventory which should be excluded from the 
probate estate, and any changes in appraised values, and the value 
of distributable estate at date of distribution. 
t ~ 
,<i?? 
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I 
i • • . ' • » 
! 
{ 3. That the Courtfs prior findings that George K. Lewis! 
I intended his surviving spouse to have a part of the estate, not 
the whole estate were proper and, therefore, should be affirmed.._J, 
;{[ 2 "r- 2 beeriTf nlVyr^GvTs^^ eiliis^^^ 
the Court finds that: • 
j .1. The decedent, George K. Lewis, left a valid will 
dated November 5, 1971, appointing Ben E. Lewis as executor and I 
[j Personal Representative of "*hi3~estate. ~t:r^:^~^-7~
 TT.-^ -^.~-:-*-• : ^ .^ rv|-
! 2. Based upon the language of the will, the testator j 
| did not intend that his widow receive the entire estate, but that I 
j she was to receive a "fair portion", "portion" being used in its 
j ordinary and customary meaning as a part of the whole, not the 
I entire amount. 
\ \ - ' : " • - ' / " . . ' * . - • • | 
ii • ' '• i . . • '-••;."v.-* -. - , '•'- • ••' .•' '•• ' - , v .-- ? 
II 3. The dispositive provisions of the decedent's will 
!( fail to designate specific properties or portions of the estate [ 
ji I 
|i for distribution of the testator's properties. Therefore, the 
j{ j 
• property should be distributed according to the succession J 
j . j 
j statutes of the State of Utah in effect at the date of decedent's 
death. This distribution accords with the testator's expressed 
general intent. j 
I! 4. The interests of the heirs of the decedent vested in! 
(the estate property upon the decedent's date of death. J 
h I 
| 5. Distributions from the estate should be made J 
jj pursuant to the succession statutes contained in Chapter 4 of the ; 
| Utah Code Annotated (1953)(repealed 1977) Sections 74-4-3, j 
i ; 
i 74-4-4, and 74-4-5. The proper application of these statutes j 
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require that the Personal Representative determine the value of 
the net probate estate at the date of death, set aside to the 
surviving spouse the first $100#000.00 in value of the net 
o jeo.tater^n^4/2 of. the- excess -ever^ ^ HKU^OO^iJO^in varliae^^^B 
Calculate the portion of the estate this represents and apply the 
resulting percentage to the current value of the net distributable) 
estate available for distribution, 
i^ .?-.->r;vwidS^ voThe- ^remainder--of^-fche. issAies raised by- Rhoda Lee — > •; 
j Lewis should be set on the trial calendar. In the event that a 
trial date cannot be obtained within a reasonably short period of 
! time, the case can be set for special hearing before this Court 
* 
! with the approval of the Probate Judge. 
7. It appears that Rhoda Lee Lewis is entitled to a 
distribution of $175,230.03 of estate assets and such a distribu-
! tion can take place at this time. 
! 
i 
\ THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered: 
! 1. Pursuant to the Courts interpretation of the 
decedent's will of November 5, 1971, the decedent's estate shall 
be distributed under the will in accordance with the succession 
statutes of the State of Utah in effect at the date of decedent's 
death. 
2. The application of the succession statutes require 
that the Personal Representative determine the value of the net 
probate estate at the date of death, set aside to the surviving 
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spouse the first $100,000.00 in value of the net probate estate 
and 1/2 of the excess over $100,000.00 in value. Calculate the 
1 portion of the estate this represents and apply the resulting per-! 
^
r
 d¥ritagS" to the" current" value of " tKe~'net Sis'trib'utable estate" "to * 
determine the surviving spouse's share. 
3. It is incumbent upon the Personal Representative to 
ascertain the correct fair market values of estate assets to be * 
distributed at~"date"o"f' death a!hd~~dateT o^ i^strlbution."""•*""" 
4. The Personal Representative is directed to make a 
partial distribution of the probate assets of the estate in the 
' - * * * - ' • * • . . * • . • * 
amount of $175,230.03", based upon the values of the assets as 
set forth in the Petition for Final Settlement and Distribution 
subject to possible adjustment, if any, by the Court upon the 
resolution of the remaining issues raised by Petitioner, Rhoda 
Lee Lewis. Such distribution may begin within five (5) days after 
| the entry of this Order. ,-•*-• 
5. The claims and objections of Rhoda Lee Lewis to the 
1
 Final "Settlement and Distribution of" the Estate shall be set for 
a separate trial pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or, in the event a trial date cannot be obtained in a 
reasonably short period, the parties may obtain the approval of 
the sitting Probate Judge for a special hearing before this Court. 
! r 
< - io - . . . . . • • • i 
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6. This Order shall constitute a final Order as to the 
proper interpretation of the decedent's will and the proper 
method of calculating the rights of the heirs- o~f .th^^^ate^-taar-^r 
s^ L^ -^g -g-gge 
the estate's assets pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah-Rules;of 
Civil Procedure* 
Dated: ^ ^ /6 ft frl 
Approved as to Form: 
i U Charles M. Bennett 
^-••.r-rwx *, 
JUDGETSPOTT DSHIEIS- r? 
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APPENDIX D 
Decedent's 197 5 Trust Agreement 
R. 180 ex. 2 
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TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah this ^0 day of JuUfiI1J& by and between GEORGE K. LEWIS, 
hereinafter referred to as "Trustor" and ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee", 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, it is the purpose, desire and intent of the Trustor, by this 
Trust Agreement, to make disposition of his estate upon his death, including 
any undivided interest, corporate stock, and various business enterprises, 
whether held solely or in partnership or in joint venture with others, and 
any and all interest in and to real and personal property whatsoever, belonging 
to the Trustor, to the persons and institutions and in the manner herein recite^, 
subject however to the particular powers, conditions, reservations and rights 
of revocation or amendment hereinafter recited, and ! 
WHEREAS, the Trustor desires to reserve until his death, the j 
I 
possession and use of the Trust property, without rental or other accounting 
to the Trustee, and the management and control of the said property, j 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED by the parties hereto as follows* 
! 
! 
1* The Trustor, by this Agreement does hereby transfer, set over j 
i 
and convey to the Trustee the property constituting the corpus of this Trust, 
as is more particularly described in Schedule A attached hereto, to be held, ; 
i 
managed and distributed as is hereinafter provided. \ \ 
2. IT IS MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the Trustor does, by j 
this Agreement, reserve' the possession and use only of the Trust Property, 
without rental or other accounting to Trustee, and the use, management and 
control of the said property and any income therefrom, but legal title shall 
nevertheless be that of Trustee. The said Trustor shall have the sole right 
at any time, during his lifetime, which right must be executed by him 
personally, to revoke the Trust herein created in whole or in part upon paying 
any sum due Trustee and indemnifying the Trustee to its satisfaction against 
liabilities incurred in the administration of the Trust. Such revocation shall 
be upon written notice to the Trustee, and upon such revocation, the Trustee 
.shall reconvey such property as may be subject to such revocation, to the Trustor 
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3. The Trustor, on terms specified by hi" in writing may direct the 
Trustee froni ti^e to time, to sell, convey, dispose of, lease cr take any other 
action with resoect to the said Trust Property, the consideration thereof if 
any other than rentals, to be delivered to Trustee to become a part of the 
Trust Estate, subject however to such use, application or distribution not 
inconsistent with this Agreement as the said Trustor shall direct. 
4. The right reserved by Trustor to have possession and use of the 
Trust Property without rental or other accounting to the Trustee, and the 
management and control of said property may be waived by the Trustor by written 
notice to the Trustee. The right so reserved shall be deemed waived in the 
event the Trustor shall become incompetent or shall be incapable of handling 
business affairs. If at any time the Trustor should become incompetent or for 
any other reason be unable to act in his own behalf, the Trustee may in its ; 
absolute discretion pay to or apply for the benefit of the Trustor, in addition 
to the payments herein above provided for him such amounts from the principal 
of the Trust Estate, upto the whole thereof as the Trustee may from time to time 
deem necessary or advisable for his use or benefit. The Trustee shall be en- ! 
titled to rely conclusively on the opinion of the Trustor's then attending j 
physician as to the conpetency of the Trustor, whether by reason of physical ! 
i 
or mental causes or any combination thereof. j 
i 
5. Upon the death of the Trustor, the interests of the surviving ' 
i 
beneficiaries hereunder shall vest. However, the power in any person to '• 
i 
revoke, alter, or amend the Trust herein created, in whole or in part, shall | 
cease and terminate and the Trustee shall thereupon proceed in an orderly fash-' 
i 
ion to liquidate all the assets of the Trust and reduce the same to cash or j 
suitable securities or receivables as it shall, in its discretion determine to 
be in the best interests of the Trust and the beneficiaries. 
6. Upon the death of the Trustor, if he is survived by his wife, 
Rhoda Lewis, the Trustee shall divide the Trust Estate into two separate Trusts 
hereinafter designated as the Marital Trust and the Charitable Trust, the 
assets including cash of each Trust to be fairly representative of appreciation 
or depreciation in the value of all property thus available for distribution 
and tj t.,e ascertained as follows: 
(A) ^ne varital Trust shall consist of property of a value ec^ ial to 
u - ro.nt of the •••axi':iu:- Marital deduction allowable determining the Federal 
_ .,tatv ~ax i. on '; - Trustor's Estate, diminished by the value of all other ', 
-2- 1 
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items which qualify :'; r the ^aid deductu-:, and which pass c shall have passed 
to the Trustor's wife under- the Will of the Trustor or which is deeed to have 
passed from the Trustor to Rhoda Lewis, wife of the Trustor, for the purposes 
of the Marital deduction. In making such computation and distribution only 
assets which qualify for the Marital deduction shall be distributed to the 
Marital Trust provided, that the Trustee in making distribution hereunder shall 
select the assets to be distributed in such a rrtanner as to have an aggregate 
fair niarket value, fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation 
in the value tc the date cr dates of such distribution of all properties then 
available for such distribution. The Marital Trust shall be free of any and 
all estate, inheritance, transfer, legacy or succession taxes of death duties, 
either state or federal or of any costs of administration of the Trustor's 
Estate or of the Marital Trust, all of which shall be paid from the Charitable . 
Trust without apportionment thereof. The Marital Trust shall be held, managed 
and distributed as is hereinafter provided. ; 
(B) All of the rest, residue, and remainder of the Trust Estate ; 
after payment therefrom of all estate, inheritance, transfer, legacy or 
succession taxes or death duties either state or federal and of any costs of , 
j 
administration of the Trustor's Estate shall be held by the Trustee as the i 
"Charitable Trust" to be held, managed, and distributed as is hereinafter 
provided. ; 
7. After dividing the Trust Estate as herein above provided, the 
Trustee shall pay to the Trustor's wife, Rhoda Lewis, in monthly or other 
i 
convenient installments, not less frequently than annually, all of the net 
income of the Marital Trust during her lifetime. If at any time in the ! 
absolute discretion of the Trustee, Rhoda Lewis should be in any need of funds 
for her proper care, maintenance and support, the Trustee may, in its discretioh 
pay to her or apply for her benefit, in addition to the amounts herein above 
provided for her, such amounts from the principal of the Marital Trust up to j 
the whole thereof as the Trustee may from time to time deem necessary or 
advisable for her use and benefit. Upon the death of Rhoda Lewis, the Trustee 
bhall distribute the entire remaining principal of the Marital Trust as she 
-ha! appoint in her Will, free of this Trust, to her estate or in favor of any 
other r-erson or persons. It is the intention of the Trustor that Rhoda Lewis • 
:^aii hove the Lroaoest possible power of appointment by Will, as to the 
,--r inc isa! rf V r ^rust retaining at her death, which power shall be exercisable 
-3-
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by her alone and in ai^ events. Provided however, that in the even+ that 
Rhoda Lewis shall fail ic exercise her power of appointment the reraimnp 
principal of the r.'ariia! "iruc-t shall be disposea of in the sa^e manner as the 
principal of the Charitable Irust. 
S. The Trustee shall administer the Charitable Trust as follows: 
(A) Commencing on the anniversary date of the death of the Trustor 
or the death of the Trustor's wife, Rhoda Lewis, whichever shall last occur, 
and on each such anniversary date thereafter, the Trustee shall pay all of the 
accumulated income to the Brigham Young University at Provo, Utah, to be 
administered as the "Olena K. Lewis Scholarship Fund." The said Brigha'r Young 
University through its then officers shall appoint a scholarship committee to 
be composed of the following persons: 
1. The then Director or Dean of the Art Department of Brigham 
Young University. ; 
2. The Director of Admissions of Brigham Young universtiy. 
3. The Dean of Men. 
4 . The Dean of Women. j . 
5. The Student-body Pres ident . * 
The said committee as so constituted shall recommend worthy students! 
enrolled in the Art Department of the Brigham Young University as recipients 
of scholarships from the fund. Said scholarships shall be in the amount of J 
$2,000.00 each or less, and each annual distribution of income shall be 
distributed within the subsequent year to such students. The recipients of 
such scholarships may in the discretion of the scholarship committee be
 ; 
Freshmen or entering students, undergraduate students, or graduate and post-
graduate students. 
i 
(B) The Trustee may accept contributions or gifts from other personi 
to be and become a part of the corpus of the 'KMena K. Lewis Scholarship Fund"[ 
and the donor of any such contribution shall be separately and individually 
identified when granting any scholarship or benefit from such donation. 
(C) Upon expiration of ten years following the anniversary date of 
ihe death of the Testator or the wife of the Testator, Rhoda Lewis, whichever 
:>.«?.!'; last occur, the Trustee shall pay over and distribute the entire 
r-r,dinin,j Tru t corpus to tne Brigham Young University at Provo, Utah, to 
Uereafter adminster by the Jniversity, the said Olena K. Lewis Scholarship 
r
 ..rv.< . •-. acccr ;ar ~e with the directions for the administration thereof contained 
-A-
i 
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in this "Ir'if.* A;.« reei-en t ai which tine ir.v 1 ru t created he-e.nder ihali 
ter r.ate. 
9. The Trustor directs that the Trustee shall, rollowing the death 
of the Trustor, seek the advice and counsel of the Trustor's brother, Ren E. 
Lewis, in the administration of the Trust Estate or Estates. However, the 
ultimate decisions in the a dr. in 1 strati on of the Trust Estate or Estates shall 
be the right and the obligation of the Trustee hereunder. 
10. In the event that the wife of the Trustor, Rhoda Lewis, shall 
not survive the Trustor, then in that event the property otherwise distributable 
to the Marital Trust shall be paid over and distributed to and become a part 
of the corpus of the Charitable Trust. 
11. To carry out the purposes of this Trust and subject to any 
limitations stated elsewhere in this instrument, the Trustee shall have the 
following powers in addition to any now or hereafter conferred by law. 
(A) To invest and reinvest the principal, and income if the Trustee 
is required to accumulate it, and to purchase or acquire therewith every kind 
of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment, * 
specifically including but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of j 
every kind, and stocks, preferred or common, which men of prudence, discretion ; 
and intelligence acquire for their own account. 
(B) To manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, partition, divide, 
! 
subdivide, improve, repair; to grant options, and to sell upon deferred t 
payments; to lease for terms within or extending beyond the duration of this 
Trust for any purpose, including exploration for and removal of gas, oil and 
i 
other minerals; to enter into community oil leases, pooling and unitization i 
agreements; to create restrictions, easements and other servitudes; to 
compromise, arbitrate or otherwise adjust claims in favor of or against the 
Trust; to institute, compromise and defend actions and proceedings; to carry 
such insurance as the Trustee may deem advisable. 
(C) To continue to hold any property, including shares of the 
Trustee's own stock, if and so long as the Trustee in the exercise of good 
faith, considers the retention is in the best interests of the Trust. Except 
a^ to a residence or other property held for the personal use of the Trustor, , 
it" unproductive property is at any time held as an asset of the Marital Trust, 
iho Trustee shall either nake such property productive or convert it to ' 
•jroj.-tive :,rc;.f'ty within a reasonable iime after the Trustor's death, not-
*.
 4>.s\ar!dir'.v any t*ov:sion herein to the contrary. I 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(D. To operate at the risk of the Trur.t -state any property or 
busiffcL s received in th j
 £ ir^.t, as lorv as the trustee n,ay deep advisable, 
t'r-e profits And losses Ihrsrefriv: to inure to or be chargeable to the 1 rust 
Estate as a whole and not to the Trustee, and to participate in the 
incorporation of any business in which any Trust may become financially 
interested. 
(L) To advance to this Trust for any trust purpose, such advances 
with interest at current rates to be a first lien and to be repaid out of 
principal or incone; to reinburt.e itself from principal or income for any loss 
or expense incurred by reason of its ownership or holding of any Trust 
property. 
(F) To borrow money for any Trust purpose upon such terms and 
conditions as the Trustee may deem proper, and to obligate the Trust Estate 
for repayment} to encumber the Trust Estate or any of its property by mortgage,! 
deed of trust, pledge or otherwise using such procedure to consummate the j 
transaction as the Trustee may deem advisable. 
I 
(G) To have respecting securities all rights, powers and privileges 
of an owner, including the power to pay assessments and oiher sums deemed by ; 
! 
the Trustee necessary for the protection of the Trust Estate; to participate 
i 
in voting trusts; pooling agreement, foreclosures, reorganizations, consolida-
tions, liquidations and stock redemptions and in connection therewith to ". 
deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee 
under such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; to exercise or sell stock 
i 
subscription or conversion rights; to accept and retain as an investment any 
securities or other property received through the exercise of any of the • 
foregoing powers, regardless of any limitations elsewhere in this instrument j 
relative to investments by the Trustee. 
(H) Upon any division or partial or final distribution of the Trust 
Estate, to partition,allot, and distribute the Trust Estate in undivided * 
interests or in kind, or partly in money and partly in kind, at valuations 
determined by the Trustee, and to sell such property as the Trustee may deem 
necessary to make division or distribution. 
(I) To budget the estimated annual income and expenses of the Trust 
in such .anner as to equalize, as far as practicable, periodic income payments 
* o htr.crf • t lar i es. • • 
i 
(J! I"c oeter rine what is principal or income of the Trust Estate and! 
-6 -
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apportion and allocate in it'-, discretion any and all receipt and expenses as 
between the*.e accounts, except insofar as the Trustee shall exercise the 
discretion herein converred, and except as otherwise provided in this instrument 
ratters relating to principal and income shall be governed by the provisions 
of the Principal and Income Act from time to time existing. 
(K) Unless specifically limited, all discretions conferred upon the 
Trustee shall be absolute, and their exercise conclusive on all persons 
interested in this Trust. The enumeration of certain powers of the Trustee 
herein shall not be construed as a limitation upon the Trustee's power, it 
being intended that the Trustee shall have all rights, powers and privileges 
that an absolute owner of the property would have. 
12. The Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for 
services rendered by it and by counsel retained by it, including services in 
connection with the termination or revocation in whole or in part of any trust 
hereunder. 
13. If any trust hereunder, in the absolute discretion of the Trustee, 
becomes sufficiently small in value that the administration thereof is no ; 
longer economically desirable, the cost thereof is disprdportionate to the ! 
value of the assets, or the continuation thereof is no longer in the best . 
interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, the Trustee may terminate such 
Trust. Upon termination as herein provided, the Trustee shall distribute the . 
property of such Trust to the person or persons, and in the proportion, ' 
then entitled to receive the income therefrom, insofar as specified in such ! 
Trust, otherwise in equal shares. 
14. The Trustee may resign at any time. Upon its resignation, a [ 
successor may be appointed by the Trustor if living or by a majority of the 
legally competent beneficiaries then entitled to receive income from the 
Trust Estate, or, if they fail to do so, by a court of competent jurisdiction 
i 
upon petition of the resigning Trustee or of a person interested in the Trust. ' 
15. The validity and construction of this Agreement shall be 
conirolled by the laws of the State of Utah. 
16. If any provision of this Agreement shall be unenforceable, the 
regaining provisions nevertheless shall be carried into effect. 
\H WIT'ifSS whereof the parties have executed this Agreement, the 
year a^j/date fir.?t above written 
^ yriONAL BANK 
fefc£2^ZZI 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to be 
hand delivered to 
Charles M. Bennett 
Greene, Callister & Nebeker 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
this 5th day of December, 198 3. 
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